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Abstract—Recent studies highlighting the vulnerability of computer architecture to information leakage attacks have been a cause of
significant concern. Among the various classes of microarchitectural attacks, cache timing channels are especially worrisome since they
have the potential to compromise users’ private data at high bit rates. Prior works have demonstrated the use of cache miss patterns to
detect these attacks. We find that cache miss traces can be easily spoofed and thus they may not be able to identify smarter adversaries.
In this work, we show that cache occupancy, which records the number of cache blocks owned by a specific process, can be leveraged
as a stronger indicator for the presence of cache timing channels. We observe that the modulation of cache access latency in timing
channels can be recognized through analyzing pairwise cache occupancy patterns. Our experimental results show that cache occupancy
patterns cannot be easily obfuscated even by advanced adversaries that successfully evade cache miss-based detection.
Index Terms—Computer Security, Timing Channels, Cache Occupancy Analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH rapid growth in the use of computer systems for storingand accessing user data, protecting sensitive information and
shielding them from malicious entities is an important task for computer
architects. The recent attacks exploiting micro-architecture [31] have
further stressed the need for hardware and information security to be
considered as first-order design constraints in computer architecture.
Among the many forms of information leakage attacks, timing channels
are particularly notorious for their stealthy exfiltration of sensitive
information, leaving no physical evidence for forensic examination.
These timing channels simply rely on the modulation of resource access
timing that cannot be easily audited by software security monitors.
Among various architectural units, caches are most exploited for
timing channel attacks due to two major reasons: 1. CPU cache is one
of the most commonly shared resources, and hence processes from
different domains typically have access to it. 2. Caches are tightly
coupled with processor pipelines and cannot be simply disabled for
security reasons.
Prior studies have studied cache-based timing channel attacks
that manipulate accesses on various cache levels [13], [25]. CC-
hunter [3] detects covert timing channel by capturing cache conflict
misses between two processes, and needs hardware to provide fine-
grained information about mutual cache evictions. This may potentially
involve increased hardware costs if such infrastructure is not already
available. Recent works identify cache timing channel by analyzing
the cache miss patterns using existing performance counters [6], [15].
While these techniques may be more cost-effective without requiring
additional hardware modifications, we demonstrate in this work that
such cache miss-based detection could be evaded by sophisticated
adversaries, and hence, may be circumvented.
In this paper, we propose the use of a new statistic–cache
occupancy–that can be utilized for improved detection of cache timing
channels. Cache occupancy records the number of cache blocks owned
by a specific process in a certain cache during the observation period.
We find that the trojan/victim and spy’s modulation of cache access
latencies generates unique patterns in cache occupancy traces between
the two processes, that can be identified through correlation analysis.
Meanwhile, unlike cache miss events that only offer a uni-dimensional
view (i.e., always a non-negative number of events in the current
epoch), cache occupancy profiles exhibit a gain-loss pattern depending
on the cache blocks gained or lost in the current observation period.
Essentially, cache occupancy patterns for two processes inherently
reflect mutual cache eviction behavior and can be more indicative of
potential malicious behavior by a spy process (and/or trojan in case of
covert timing channels). Our study demonstrates that cache occupancy
is a much better indicator for cache timing channels. Fortunately, recent
commercial processors already started to support cache occupancy
monitoring for application domains at runtime [7], making it possible to
build practical and robust solutions for cache timing channel detection.
In summary, the major contributions of our article are:
• We show that the adversaries’ attempt to modulate cache access
latencies using conflict misses generates distinct cache occupancy
patterns during cache timing channels. By analyzing the cache
occupancy profiles between two suspicious processes, cache
timing channel may be inferred.
• We design and demonstrate a prototype for cache timing channel
detection, and evaluate using real-world cache timing channel
attacks. Our results show that, despite adversaries’ effort to add
intentional cache miss patterns and evade detection, our analysis
using cache occupancy is still able to accurately capture trojan-spy
communication. We highlight the potential of leveraging cache
occupancy to build robust cache timing channel detection.
2 BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
2.1 Cache Timing Channel Attacks
Timing channels typically involve two processes: trojan/victim and
spy, where the spy learns of sensitive secrets from trojan/victim.
Within many kinds of cache-based timing channels, Prime+Probe
is the most commonly leveraged technique for cache access timing
modulation [13]. Typically, the spy deciphers secrets by measuring
the cache access timing and finding out whether the accesses result
in cache conflict misses or not. In general, there are two classes of
communication protocols: single group-based attacks and multiple
groups-based attacks [24].
Single-group attacks [21]: In this class of attacks, the trojan and spy
sweep through the entire cache or partial of the cache. During the
prime phase, the spy fills some cache sets. The trojan either accesses
the cache sets to fill them with its own data, or remains idle and spy’s
contents are left intact. The spy probes these cache blocks and measures
access latencies. Longer latency values indicate cache conflict misses,
while shorter latencies indicate cache hits. Secret bits are deciphered
based on cache latencies.
Multiple-group attacks [13]: In these attacks, the trojan and spy
exploit multiple groups (e.g., two groups) of cache sets to communicate
the bits. Initially, the spy primes both groups of cache sets by filling all
of the ways with its own data. The trojan may either replace contents
in the first (odd) or second (even) group of cache sets. The spy probes
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Fig. 1: Cache occupancy changes for trojan and spy
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Fig. 2: Cache occupancy changes for benign workloads: lbm and
gobmk.
both groups of cache sets, and depending on the group with higher
cache access latency, the secret bits are decoded.
2.2 Threat Model
Our attack model assumes that there is a benign victim or a malicious
insider process with access to sensitive information. At the same time,
there exists a spy who is trying to steal or infer the secrets. In this
article, we demonstrate a robust attacker that does not rely on any
memory sharing, and utilizes Prime+Probe-based techniques to launch
attacks by creating conflict misses on cache sets. In the rest of this
article, we use the term trojan to refer to both victims in side channels
and trojans in covert channels, since they are behaviorally similar in
terms of mutual cache evictions.
3 CACHE OCCUPANCY CHANGES IN TIMING CHANNELS
In this section, we describe how cache occupancy patterns manifest
during timing channel attacks that provide the fundamental motivation
for our framework.
Cache Occupancy Patterns for Adversaries. In single-group attacks,
when trojan transmits a bit ‘1’, the trojan’s cache occupancy should
first increase (due to trojan fetching its cache blocks) and then decrease
(during spy’s probe phase when trojan-owned blocks are replaced).
Similarly, the spy’s cache footprint would first decrease (due to trojan’s
filling in the cache blocks) and then increase (when spy probes and fills
the cache with its own data). When trojan transmits a bit ‘0’, neither of
the processes change their respective cache occupancies. In two-group
attacks, regardless of whether trojan transmits ‘1’ or ‘0’, we observe a
gain-loss pattern in their cache occupancies.
To experimentally demonstrate our observation, we implement a
single group attack, and study cache occupancy changes. Figure 1
shows a representative window capturing rate of change in cache
occupancy over time. As we can see, the trojan’s cache occupancy gain
in proportion to spy’s loss and vice versa. In other words, each gain in
cache occupancy by the trojan is coupled by a corresponding loss of
occupancy on the spy’s side, and vice versa. Moreover, we can also
observe a sequence repetitive pattern of gain-loss curves in timing
channels due to a series of continuous transmission.
Cache Occupancy for Benign Workloads. To contrast with regular
applications that have no known timing channels, we also show a rep-
resentative benign application pair from SPEC2006 benchmarks [10]
with relatively high cache activity, namely lbm and gobmk. We observe
that these application pairs do not usually show any repetitive gain-loss
pattern in their occupancy traces. As we can see from Figure 2, the
occupancy patterns are rarely correlated (no obvious gain-loss patterns),
e.g., there are time periods when both applications have unaligned
negative dips such as in time period t1. This may correspond to effect
from a third party process’s cache accesses. In time period t2, we
observe that one application’s cache occupancy fluctuates while the
other remains unchanged, indicating that these two benchmarks are not
competing for caches mutually. Finally, there are time periods (such as
in time period t3) when the two cache occupancies almost change in the
same direction. Overall, we can see that the cache occupancy curves
between the two benign applications over time are fairly random.
Observations. Based on the discussion above, we make the following
key observation: Timing channels in caches fundamentally rely on
repetitive conflict misses that enables the trojan to influence spy’s
cache access timing. These conflict misses create repetitive gain-loss
patterns in cache occupancy regardless of the specific timing channel
implementations.
Unlike cache timing channel attacks, benign workloads do not
intentionally create conflict misses in repetitive and controlled manner,
and hence their cache occupancy patterns are sporadic and largely
irregular, making them easily distinguishable from the attackers.
Therefore, cache occupancy can be utilized as a useful source of
information for cache timing channel detection.
4 WHY IS CACHE OCCUPANCY A BETTER INDICATOR?
Cache occupancy can be used as a better indicator to detect cache
timing channels compared to cache miss patterns for several reasons.
As discussed in Section 3, the cache occupancy traces for the trojan
and spy pair inherently exhibit gain-loss patterns. In other words,
these two patterns will have a strong negative-correlation, which
can be captured with cross-correlation analysis. More importantly,
cache occupancy-based analysis can use effective filtering for non-
timing channel activities. Specifically, conflict misses are a fundamental
mechanism to alter cache access timings. If conflicts misses happen
between two processes, we could observe gains in cache occupancy for
one process and simultaneous losses in occupancy for the other process
(and vice versa). Other patterns such as both gains or both losses in
cache occupancy are related to non-communicating activities (such as
influence from third party processes), and hence can be filtered for
robust cache timing channel identifications.
In contrast, number of cache misses is an unidirectional measure
within any period of time. A trojan or a spy process can intentionally
issue additional memory accesses that inflate its own cache miss
patterns and weaken the correlation with the other process involved.
Additionally, the effect of external application activities to the cache
miss traces cannot be easily separated from timing channel-related
cache misses.
5 DETECTING CACHE TIMING CHANNELS
To detect potential adversaries, we collect traces of both cache
misses and cache occupancy, and compute the normalized cross-
correlation (absolute value) for a pair of applications. The normalized
cross-correlation has a value range of 0 to 1. If the value of the
cross-correlation is 1, the two traces are linearly correlated and
indicate that modulation of cache accesses typically seen in trojan-spy
communication. On the other hand, a close-to-zero value represents that
the two traces have no correlation and the two corresponding processes
are largely independent, which can be considered as lack of any explicit
modulation in cache accesses. The normalized cross-correlation of two
series x and y is:
γx,y(τ) = | 1N∑n
1
σxσy
(x(n)− x)(y(n− τ)− y)| (1)
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Fig. 3: Cache miss patterns for trojan and spy without noise (Top) and
with intentionally added noise (Bottom).
where σx and σy are the standard deviations of series x and y, x and y
are the means of series x and y, and τ is the lag of the two series.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Experimental Setup
Simulation Platform. We use Gem5 [2], a cycle-accurate full system
simulator to perform our measurements. We configure Gem5 with four
x86 cores, 32KB per core private 2-way set associative L1 cache and a
512KB shared 8-way set associative L2 cache. Each application thread
is pinned to a separate core using taskset. All experiments are run
in full system mode under a minimal Linux distribution with kernel
version 2.6.32. We instrument the simulated cache infrastructure to
support per-core cache occupancy tracking.
Runtime Correlation Analysis. We implement a kernel thread that
periodically reads per-core cache miss and occupancy values at a
sampling rate of 20KHz. Note that our detection algorithm in Section 5
employs a pairwise analysis in the system since the existence of trojan
and spy is not known ahead of time. We note that not all pairs of
application domains need to monitored, and can be limited to mutually
distrusting or suspicious ones. The detection is performed every one
seconds, which is significantly longer than the time to compute the
cross-correlation of an application pair (< 10ms).
Cache Timing Channel Attacks. We implement a prime+probe covert
channel attack on last level cache (L2 cache) similar to those prior
works [13], [21]. We generate 32 sets of addresses for the trojan and
spy. Addresses in the same set will map to the same cache set, which
would be used to create conflict misses. We configure the trojan and
spy to utilize a single group of cache sets. Note multi-group attacks
will exhibit similar gain-loss cache occupancy patterns (as discussed
in Section 3).
6.2 Identifying Sophisticated Adversaries
We implement a naive and a sophisticated trojan-spy pair with the
following setup:
• The two processes dynamically generate certain sets of conflict
addresses (that map to 32 cache sets).
• The selected cache sets are split into two parts. The first 16 sets
are used in timing channel communication and the second half
will be utilized for random noise injection.
• In a naive case, the trojan and spy merely exploit the 16 sets
earmarked for covert communication. For smart adversaries,
during each iteration of the spy’s prime and probe phase, it
simultaneously accesses a random number of sets with random
intervals to create additional cache misses.
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Fig. 4: Cache occupancy patterns for trojan and spy without noise
(Top) and with intentionally added noise (Bottom).
We sample the L2 cache misses as well as the cache occupancy
with a sampling window of 10,000 cycles. Figure 3 shows the cache
miss patterns for the naive and sophisticated adversaries. When no
intentional noise is injected, we observe multiple peaks in cache misses
interleaved between the trojan and spy (top plot in Figure 3). In most
cases, a sharp peak from the trojan is followed by a very similar
sharp peak from the spy, which corresponds to trojan’s eviction in the
prime/probe and spy’s eviction when it accesses the same cache sets.
However, after the noise is injected, the strongly coupled cache miss
peaks from the trojan and spy no longer exist. We observe that the spy
has cache misses that differ in both time and space dimension. The
continuous cache miss pattern in the spy makes it almost non-correlated
with the trojan (bottom plot in Figure 3). Figure 4 demonstrates the
cache occupancy traces for the same attacks. In the naive scenario,
we can see the strong gain-loss pattern shown as the mirroring cache
occupancy from the two processes. Even with the smart adversaries,
we are still able to observe similar patterns due to the fact that cache
occupancy only records mutual behavior in cache block gain and losses.
More importantly, it is immune to noise effects from self-eviction and
interference from third party processes (that will reflect as mutual
cache occupancy change between that process and the adversary). We
compute the cross-correlation between the trojan and spy using both
the cache miss and the cache occupancy patterns (See Section 5).
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the two sets of normalized cross-
correlation values at various lags. The value shown in each of the
plots represents the highest correlation value observed. We can see that
using cache miss patterns, there is a relative high correlation (0.79)
between trojan and spy in the naive attack. However, when intentional
noise is injected by the spy in the form of additional cache misses,
the value drops significantly to 0.4, which successfully obfuscates
cross-correlation and thus hides the traces of communications. On
the other hand, cache occupancy-based analysis exhibits much higher
robustness in indicating the presence of cache timing channels: First,
in the naive attack, the correlation in trojan-spy occupancies is even
higher compared to that in cache misses (1.0); More importantly, there
is very minimal change (<0.01) in occupancy-based correlation after
additional cache misses are injected intentionally by sophisticated
adversaries. The results clearly show that cache occupancy can be
leveraged as a stronger evidence for detecting cache timing channels.
Interestingly, we also find that the cross-correlation peaks at a
certain non-zero lag for cache miss traces (in Figure 5), but always
peaks with zero lag for cache occupancy traces. This is because there
is a delay in time corresponding to trojan’s and spy’s cache miss events
during timing channels. However, trojan and spy’s occupancy traces
change simultaneously (temporally, spy’s loss is trojan’s gain and vice
versa). Hence, they always align as we can see from Figure 3 and
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Fig. 5: Cross-correlation between miss patterns with naive, noise-
free trojan-spy (Top) and sophisticated trojan-spy with injected noise
patterns in cache misses (Bottom).
Figure 4. This indicates the potential benefits of occupancy-based
analysis in terms of speed as only 0-lag has to be calculated to
determine the maximum cross-correlation.
6.3 Discussion
A potential way for an individual attacker (either trojan or spy) to fuzz
the suspicious cache occupancy pattern is through explicitly issuing the
clflush instruction that decreases its cache occupancy by itself. Note
that normal load and store instructions can only increase the cache
occupancy. In this case, clflush instructions can be audited to obtain
the cache occupancy changes associated with the existence of timing
channels. Also, in some systems, clflush instruction is disabled from
user-space due to various security concerns (such as Google’s Native
Client Sandbox [30]).
7 RELATED WORK
Cache side- and covert timing channels have been demonstrated on
real hardware in prior studies [1], [13], [16], [21], [22], [25], [26], [28],
[29].
Venkataramani et al. [18] propose a generic framework that detects
cache covert timing channel using correlations between cache conflict
misses. ReplayConfusion [24] records and replays cache access traces
from the trojan and spy, and detects cache timing attacks based
on differences of cache misses under different cache slice hashing
functions. Fang et al [9] have demonstrated novel use of hardware
prefetchers to stop cache timing channels. These techniques require
customized hardware for either fine-grained conflict miss tracking or
cache design changes.
Additionally, Demme et al. propose a machine learning-based
approach that identifies cache side channels based on performance
counters [8]. We note that as a stronger indicator, cache occupancy
observations can be leveraged together for more robust detection.
Meanwhile, our detection framework using cache occupancy can be
potentially incorporated with existing prevention techniques such as
cache partitioning [11], [20] to build end-to-end cache timing channel
defense solutions. In addition to improving cache resiliency, we note
that other mechanisms to improve software robustness [12], [14], [17],
[19], [23], [27] and memory reliability [4], [5] will improve overall
system security.
8 CONCLUSION
In this work, we motivate that cache occupancy traces can be utilized as
a better indicator for cache timing channel detection. We demonstrated
500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500
Lag
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
No
rm
. C
ro
ss
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 1.00
500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500
Lag
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
No
rm
. C
ro
ss
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 0.99
Fig. 6: Cross-correlation between occupancy patterns with naive, noise-
free trojan-spy (Top) and sophisticated trojan-spy with injected noise
patterns in cache misses (Bottom).
that cache access latency modulation between a trojan and spy
generates gain-loss cache occupancy patterns.
Our results have shown the trojan and spy’s malicious activities
can be successfully recognized even when the adversaries intentionally
inject noise (that effectively hide its traces in cache miss patterns). Our
works highlighted that the new cache event can be used to build robust
and effective cache timing channel detector in the future.
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